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Abstract—In this paper, a secure spatial modulation (SM)
system with artificial noise (AN)-aided is investigated. To achieve
higher secrecy rate (SR) in such a system, two high-performance
schemes of transmit antenna selection (TAS), leakage-based and
maximum secrecy rate (Max-SR), are proposed and a generalized
Euclidean distance-optimized antenna selection (EDAS) method
is designed. From simulation results and analysis, the four
TAS schemes have an decreasing order: Max-SR, leakage-based,
generalized EDAS, and random (conventional), in terms of SR
performance. However, the proposed Max-SR method requires
the exhaustive search to achieve the optimal SR performance,
thus its complexity is extremely high as the number of antennas
tends to medium and large scale. The proposed leakage-based
method approaches the Max-SR method with much lower com-
plexity. Thus, it achieves a good balance between complexity
and SR performance. In terms of bit error rate (BER), their
performances are in an increasing order: random, leakage-based,
Max-SR, and generalized EDAS.
Index Terms—MIMO, secure spatial modulation, transmit
antenna selection, signal-to-leakage noise ratio, artificial noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
S
PATIAL MODULATION (SM) is emerging as a promis-
ing multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) communica-
tion technology, which exploits both the index of activated
transmit antennas and amplitude phase modulation (APM) sig-
nals to carry bits information [1], [2]. Due to low complexity
of transmitter and receiver, SM technology is applicable to
energy-efficient scenarios. However, in such a SM system, it
is very possible that the confidential messages are intercepted
by unintend receivers due to the broadcast nature of wireless
channel. How to achieve a secure transmission in SM systems
is becoming a hot research topic in wireless networks.
Recently, physical layer security in MIMO systems have
been widely investigated, which exploit the uniqueness and
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time-varying characteristics of channel to obtain secure trans-
mission against eavesdropper [3]–[7]. Some literature focuses
on the investigation of SM systems for secure transmission
[8]–[13]. The authors in [8] derived the secrecy mutual in-
formation of SM with finite alphabet input and proposed a
precoding scheme to improve security for SM or space shift
keying (SSK) systems in [12]. Both [9] and [13] compressed
artificial noise (AN) onto the null-space of the desired channel
to interfere unknown eavesdropper. Via transmitting AN at
transmitter [9] or full-duplex receiver [13] may achieve a
high secrecy rate (SR) approaching to the spectral efficiency
(SE). In [10] and [11], the authors generalized precoding-aided
spatial modulation (PSM) to secrecy PSM with constructing
time-varying precoder [10] or optimizing the precoder by
jointly minimizing the receive power at eavesdropper while
maximizing the receive power at desired user [11]. PSM
systems utilize the indices of receive antennas to carry bits
information, which reduces the complexity of receiver. How-
ever, all transmit antennas are activated in PSM systems, which
results in the problems of inter-channel interference (ICI) and
inter-antenna synchronization (IAS).
On the other hand, transmit antenna selection (TAS) for
improving the performance of SM systems was firstly in-
vestigated in [14]. The authors of [14] proposed two TAS
methods: capacity-optimized antenna selection (COAS) and
Euclidean distance-optimized antenna selection (EDAS). The
EDAS scheme showed a better bit error rate (BER) perfor-
mance and higher complexity than COAS scheme. Therefore,
some literature was intended to reduce the computational and
search complexity of the EDAS scheme [15]–[18].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no research work
concerning how to design TAS methods for secure SM system.
In this paper, we will focus on the aspect research and make
our effort to address this problem, our main contributions are
summarized as follows:
1) To reach the bound of SR, a maximum secrecy rate
(Max-SR) method is proposed with exhaustive search.
In accordance with simulation results, it can show the
best SR performance in a large range of SNR.
2) To reduce the leakage of the confidential messages
power for desired user to eavesdropper, a leakage-based
TAS method is proposed for secure SM system. Also,
its low complexity version, i.e., sorting-based solution,
is presented to achieve the same SR performance. Sim-
ulation results show that the proposed leakage-based
method provides a SR performance being close to that
of the Max-SR method with far lower-complexity.
3) Finally, as a performance benchmark, we also general-
2ize the conventional EDAS method in non-secure SM
system and make it become a secure EDAS for secure
SM system. Meanwhile, we analyze and compare the
complexity for the three TAS methods.
The remainder is organized as follows. In Section II, we
describe secure SM system model and give a definition for
its average secrecy rate. Subsequently, we propose two TAS
methods: leakage-based and Max-SR, and generalize the con-
ventional EDAS scheme to secure SM system in Section III. In
Section IV, numerical simulation results are presented. Finally,
we make our conclusions in Section V.
Notation: throughout the paper, matrices, vectors, and
scalars are denoted by letters of bold upper case, bold lower
case, and lower case, respectively. Sign (·)−1, (·)H denote in-
verse, conjugate transpose, respectively. Notation E{·} stands
for the expectation operation. Matrices IN denotes the N ×N
identity matrix, and tr(·) denotes matrix trace.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Secure Spatial Modulation
Consider a typical secure SM system as shown in Fig. 1.
In the system, there are a transmitter (Alice) equipped with
N transmit antennas, a desired user (Bob) with Nb receive
antennas, and an eavesdropper (Eve) with Ne receive antennas,
respectively. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that N is
not a power of two, thus we have to select Nt = 2⌊
logN
2 ⌋ out
of N transmit antennas for mapping the bits to the antenna
index. Notice that there are a total Q =
(
N
Nt
)
patterns,
represented as Ω = {Ω1, · · · ,ΩQ}, where Ωk denotes the
antennas set of the kth pattern. After Alice chooses one pattern
from pattern set Ω and shares it with Bob through a low speed
forward link, she activates one of Nt transmit antennas to emit
M -ary APM symbol and uses the index of activated antenna to
convey partial bits information. As a result, the SE is log2MNt
bits per channel use (bpcu).
Referring to the secure SM system model in [9], the transmit
baseband signal with the aid of AN can be expressed as
x = β1
√
PSensm + β2
√
PSPANn (1)
where en is the nth column of INt for n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nt},
and sm denotes the input symbol equiprobably drawn from
discreteM -ary APM constellation for n ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}. We
normalize the input symbol power to unit, i.e., E|sm|2 = 1.
In (1), matrix PAN ∈ CNt×Nt is the AN projection matrix,
n ∼ CN (0, INt) is the random AN vector, PS is the total
transmit power, β1, and β2 are the power allocation factors
with β21 + β
2
2 = 1. Here, it is particularly noted that all
selected Nt transmit antennas are used to emit AN but only
one of them emits APM symbol. Therefore, such secure SM
system alleviates the problems of ICI and IAS compared to
conventional secure MIMO systems.
Accordingly, the signals observed at Bob and Eve can be
respectively formulated as follows
yb = β1
√
PSHTkensm + β2
√
PSHTkPANn+ nb, (2)
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Fig. 1. System model of secure SM with TAS scheme
and
ye = β1
√
PSGTkensm + β2
√
PSGTkPANn+ ne, (3)
where H ∈ CNb×N and G ∈ CNe×N are the channel state
information (CSI) of desired and eavesdropping channels,
respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume H and
G are frequency-flat Rayleigh fading channels with each
element obeying the distribution CN (0, 1) and the CSIs are
available at Alice, which might be true for active eavesdropper.
Tk ∈ RN×Nt , k = 1, 2, ..., Q, is the TAS matrix constituted
by the specifically selected Nt columns determined by Ωk of
IN . Meanwhile nb ∼ CN (0, σ2bINb) and ne ∼ CN (0, σ
2
eINe)
denote the complex additive white gaussian noise (AWGN)
vectors at Bob and Eve, respectively.
Here, we project the AN lying in the null-space of desired
channel, therefore the PAN is given by
PAN =
1
µ
[
INt −Hk
H
(
HkHk
H
)−1
Hk
]
(4)
where µ = ‖ INt −Hk
H
(
HkHk
H
)−1
Hk ‖F is the normal-
ized factor of making the identity tr(PHANPAN ) = 1 holds,
and Hk = HTk. It is obvious that HkPAN = 0, this means
the AN has no impact on Bob.
Assuming Bob has the knowledge of H and Tk, the
maximum-likelihood detector (MLD) is given by [2]
[nˆ, mˆ] = argmin
n∈[1,Nt],m∈[1,M ]
‖ yb − β1
√
PSHTkensm ‖
2 (5)
B. Average Secrecy Rate and Problem Formulation
Here, we characterize the security by evaluating average
secrecy rate, which is formulated as
R¯s = EH,G(Rs) (6)
3with
Rs = [I (x;yb |H,Tk )− I (x;ye |G,Tk )]
+
(7)
where Rs denotes the definition of SR in [3]. I (x;yb |H,Tk )
and I (x;ye |G,Tk ) are the mutual information over desired
and eavesdropping channels, respectively. According to [9],
they are formulated as follows
I (x;yb |H,Tk ) = log2
MNt −
1
MNt
Nt∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
Enb
log2
Nt∑
n′=1
M∑
m′=1
exp

‖ nb ‖2 − ‖ δn′,m′k,n,m + nb ‖2
σ2b

,
(8)
and
I (x;ye |G,Tk ) = log2
MNt −
1
MNt
Nt∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
E
n
′
e
log2
Nt∑
n′=1
M∑
m′=1
exp
(
‖ n
′
e ‖
2
− ‖W−1/2αn
′,m′
k,n,m + n
′
e ‖
2
)
(9)
where δn
′,m′
n,m , α
n′,m′
n,m and n
′
e are given by
δ
n′,m′
k,n,m = β1
√
PSHTk(ensm − en′sm′), (10)
α
n′,m′
k,n,m = β1
√
PSGTk(ensm − en′sm′), (11)
and
n
′
e =W
−1/2(β2
√
PSGTkPANn+ ne) (12)
where n
′
e ∼ CN (0, INe) is the AWGN vector, and W is the
covariance matrix of interference plus noise at Eve
W = β22PSGTkPANP
H
ANT
H
k G
H + σ2eINe (13)
Finally, our objective is to maximize the SR by TAS scheme,
which is written as the following optimization problem
max Rs
subject to Tk ∈ {T1,T2, ...,TQ}
(14)
which is an integer or binary optimization problem and is NP-
hard. In the next section, we will present three TAS schemes
for secure SM system.
III. PROPOSED TRANSMIT ANTENNA SELECTION
METHODS
In this section, we propose two new TAS schemes: leakage-
based and Max-SR, and generalize the conventional EDAS
method to the secure SM scenario. Then, we analyze the
complexity for the three TAS methods.
A. Proposed Leakage-Based Antenna Selection Method
1) Problem Formulation: Similar to multi-user MIMO
system in [19], we view the receive power of confidential
messages at Eve as the so-called leakage. Thus, the signal-
to-leakage-and-noise ratio (SLNR) for the nth channel of the
kth pattern is written as
SLNRn(Tk) =
β21PS ‖ HTken ‖
2
β21PS ‖GTken ‖
2 +Nbσ2b
(15)
It is assumed that all Nt TAs of the selected pattern are acti-
vated with equiprobability to transmit confidential messages,
then the optimization problem of maximizing SLNR (Max-
SLNR) is formulated as
max
Nt∑
n=1
SLNRn(Tk)
subject to Tk ∈ {T1,T2, ...,TQ}
(16)
with Tk being the optimization variable. However, the above
optimization problem can be solved by exhaustive search with
complexity O (QNt) floating-point operations (FLOPs). To
lower its complexity, the low-complexity implementation is
necessary.
2) Low-complexity sorting-based solution: Considering all
transmit antennas are uncorrelated, that is, each transmit
antenna results in different SLNR, the optimization problem
in (16) is equivalent to choose the largest Nt values from all
N SLNRs. Once we calculate the SLNR values per transmit
antenna, we simply arrange them in descending order by
sorting method as follow
SLNRpi1 ≥ SLNRpi2 ≥ · · · ≥ SLNRpiNt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nt selected antennas
≥ · · · ≥ SLNRpiN
(17)
where {pi1, pi2, ..., piN} is an ordered permutation of
{1, 2, ..., N} and SLNRpin is written as
SLNRpin =
β21PStr
(
hpinhpin
H
)
β21PStr (gpingpin
H) +Nbσ2b
(18)
where hpin and gpin are the pinth column of H and G,
respectively.
B. Proposed Max-SR Antenna Selection Method
In the previous subsection, it is hard for the proposed
leakage-based method to maximize SR. In what follows, we
will propose the Max-SR method, which aims to maximize
SR. For a specific channel realization and the kth selected
pattern, the transmission rates of desired and eavesdropping
channels are respectively bounded as [14]
α ≤ Rb ≤ α+ log2Nt, β ≤ Re ≤ β + log2Nt (19)
where α and β are given by
α = 1Nt
Nt∑
n=1
log2
(
1 +
β2
1
PS‖HTkensm‖
2
Nbσ2b
)
β = 1Nt
Nt∑
n=1
log2
(
1 +
β2
1
PS‖GTkensm‖
2
β2
2
PS‖GTkPANn‖
2+Neσ2e
) (20)
Then, the corresponding SR is bounded as
α− β − log2Nt ≤ Rs ≤ α− β + log2Nt (21)
Notice that α and β are the functions of Tk, thus we can
carefully select a pattern for maximizing α−β, which can be
formulated as
max
Nt∑
n=1
log2

 1 + β21PS‖HTkensm‖
2
Nbσ2b
1 +
β2
1
PS‖GTkensm‖
2
β2
2
PS‖GTkPANn‖
2+Neσ2e


subject to Tk ∈ {T1,T2, ...,TQ}
(22)
4In general, the optimal TAS pattern for (22) is usually obtained
by an exhaustive search approach due to the fact that the PAN
in (22) is associated with the selected pattern.
C. Generalized Euclidean Distance Antenna Selection Method
Now, we develop the generalized EDAS method. It is
well-known that the mutual information lacks closed-form
expression for discrete-input continuous-output memoryless
channels (DCMC). Here, we present a lower bound for (8)
I (x;yb |H,Tk )LB = log
MNt
2 +Nb
(
1−
1
ln2
)
−
1
MNt
Nt∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
log2
Nt∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
exp
(
− ‖ δn
′,m′
n,m ‖
2
2σ2b
)
,
(23)
which is similar to that in [20]. Note that the lower bound is
approximately tight validated by Monte-Carlo simulation, so
we may use it as an effective design metric for TAS scheme.
Notice that the term δ
n′,m′
k,n,m in (23) has an important impact
on the lower bound and the minimum Euclidean distance,
i.e., dmin = min
(n,m) 6=(n′,m′)
‖ δn
′,m′
k,n,m ‖
2, is the dominant
term in high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) region [20]. In other
words, the bigger dmin is expected to yield a higher mutual
information. Therefore, we aim to select a TAS pattern of
maximizing the minimum Euclidean distance over desired
channel or minimizing the minimum Euclidean distance over
eavesdropping channel [12], which are formulated as follows
Tk∗ = argmax
Tk∈{T1,T2,...,TQ}
min
(n,m) 6=(n′,m′)
‖ δn
′,m′
k,n,m ‖
2 (24)
Tk∗ = argmin
Tk∈{T1,T2,...,TQ}
min
(n,m) 6=(n′,m′)
‖ αn
′,m′
k,n,m ‖
2 (25)
Here, we obtain two TAS patterns by (24) and (25), then
we select the one which results in higher Rs. Note that some
low complexity methods for efficiently solving the problems
in (24) and (25) can be found in [15], [16], [18].
D. Complexity Analysis and Comparison
Here, we make a complexity comparison concerning the
above three methods. It is obvious that the proposed leakage-
based method has the lowest complexity of N(2Nb+2Ne) +
O(N2) ≈ O(N2) FLOPs, where the term O(N2) is the
search complexity of sorting operation. For the proposed
Max-SR method, the complexity is about 2QNt[N
2
t (Nb +
Ne) + Nt(2N
2
b + Ne) + 2Ne + Nb] ≈ O(QN
3
t ) FLOPs.
The complexity of generalized EDAS method is made up of
three terms [18]: (a) the computational complexity of the upper
triangle matrix of minimum Euclidean distance, (b) the search
complexity for optimal pattern, and (c) the complexity of com-
puting secrecy rate for two patterns. The complexities of terms
(a) and (b) are given by Oa = 16M(N2 −N)
(
Nb+Ne−2
3
)
+
N [2 (Nb +Ne)− 1] and Ob =
(
Nt
2 + 3Nt + 3
)
2N−Nt −
N+5N+8
2 in [18]. The complexity of term (c) is as follows
2M2Nt
2Nnoise[2(Nt + 1)(Nb +Ne) +Ne
2] + 2Q[N2t (Ne +
Nb) + 2Nt(N
2
b +N
2
e )], where Nnoise is the number of noise
samples for evaluating the secrecy rate. In summary, it is
evident that their complexities are in increasing order: leakage-
based, Max-SR, and generalized EDAS.
IV. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical simulation results are presented to
analyze and compare the performance of three TAS methods
from different aspects: average secrecy rate, cumulative den-
sity function (CDF) of secrecy rate and bit error rate (BER) of
Bob. Simulation parameters are set as follows: Nb = Ne = 2,
N = 15, Nt = 8, and σ
2
b = σ
2
e . The SNR is defined as
β2
1
PS
σ2
b
, and Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) modulation
is employed.
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Fig. 2 demonstrates the average SR for the three TAS
methods described in Section-III with β22 = 0.25 and β
2
2 = 0,
where the random TAS method is used for performance
reference. For β22 = 0.25, the SR performance of the proposed
leakage-based method is very close to the Max-SR method
and better than the generalized EDAS method and random
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Fig. 4. Average BER curves of Bob for four TAS methods
method. When we adjust the value of β22 to zero, we find
the SR performance of the proposed leakage-based method
is almost identical to that of Max-SR and much better than
that of generalized EDAS method. It is also seen that random
method fails to achieve positive SR.
Fig. 3 shows the CDF curves of SR for four TAS methods
with three different values of SNRs: -5dB, 0dB, and 5dB.
It is seen from Fig. 3 that the SR performance of the pro-
posed leakage-based method is between the proposed Max-SR
method and the generalized EDAS method. With increasing
in the value of SNR, the performance of generalized EDAS
method approaches the two proposed methods due to the fact
that the minimum Euclidean distance dominates the mutual
information term in the high SNR region in accordance with
(23). As SNR increases, the CDF curves of SR moves to
the right-hand side. That is, the probability that SR falls in
the large value interval grows gradually. However, for all
three SNR values, the four TAS methods show the same SR
performance trend: Max-SR ≥ leakage-based ≥ generalized
EDAS ≥ random.
Fig. 4 illustrates the curves of average BER versus SNR
for the three TAS methods described in Section-III with
β22 = 0.25, where the random method is used for performance
reference. From Fig. 4, it is seen that the generalized EDAS
method exceeds the remaining three methods in terms of BER
performance. This is due to the fact the minimum Euclidean
distance makes an important impact on pair-error probability
(PEP) in high SNR region. The BER performances of the
proposed leakage-based and Max-SR are worse than that of
generalized EDAS and better than that of random method.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have made an extensive investigation
of TAS methods in secure SM systems. Then, two high-
performance TAS schemes: leakage-based and Max-SR, have
been proposed to improve the SR performance, and the EDAS
method has been generalized to provide a secure transmission.
From simulation results and complexity analysis, the proposed
Max-SR is the optimal TAS scheme among the three TAS
methods in terms of SR performance while the proposed
leakage-based method achieves a SR performance near to
the proposed Max-SR method with far low complexity. By
means of BER performance, the generalized EDAS methods
substantially outperforms the remaining two methods due to
its main goal to maximize minimum Euclidean distance, which
makes a direct improvement on BER performance.
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